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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, Ireland’s financial crisis threatened the stability of the global financial system, 
precipitating an international rescue package of 85 billion euro. This article analyses the 
bailout from an international relations perspective in order to gain a deeper insight into the 
nature of the political pressures that forced the negotiators to compromise over the design and 
content of Ireland’s programme of financial support. It does so by drawing on recent 
academic research on the politics of IMF decision-making. The lessons from this literature 
can help to shed light on one of the most important events in post-Independence Ireland. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Ireland’s financial crisis threatened the stability of the global financial system, 
precipitating an international rescue package of 85 billion euro.1 To fight the scale of the 
losses in the banking system and the immediacy of the European sovereign debt crisis, the 
government consented to a long-term adjustment programme under the IMF’s extended fund 
facility. The terms of the programme—the conditionality—demand years of cutbacks in 
public spending to contain the government’s exploding deficit, as well as measures to breathe 
new life into the banking system. The broader contours of the programme, described in 
Ireland’s ‘Letter of Intent’ to the IMF, European Central Bank (ECB), and European 
Commission (EC), aim at nothing less than a complete transformation of Ireland’s economy 
and society, away from a construction-led boom to an export-driven, global platform for 
foreign investment. 
Unfortunately, from its inception the programme lacked credibility, both domestically 
and internationally, because it was unable to place Ireland on a sustainable debt path without 
further European support. Almost two years later, a bitter debate continues over the terms of 
the programme. In particular, the absence of a ‘haircut’ for the unguaranteed senior 
bondholders of Irish banks remains one of the most contentious issues in Irish politics. One 
can only conclude that the architects of Ireland’s programme were forced to compromise: to 
‘buy time’ in anticipation of further European support for Ireland’s unsustainable debt 
dynamics. This article analyses the bailout from the perspective of international relations in 
order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of the political pressures that forced the 
negotiators to compromise. It does so by drawing on the latest academic literature on the 
politics of IMF decision-making, which finds that countries receive different treatment during 
                                                          




 As a consequence, Ireland is only the third rich country, after Iceland and Greece, to participate in an 
IMF programme since the United Kingdom in 1976. 
2 
bailout negotiations for a range of political and economic reasons. The lessons from this 
literature can help to shed light on one of the most important events in post-Independence 
Ireland. 
The article is structured as follows. First, I review the growing literature on how 
powerful states can influence IMF bailout negotiations. The ‘lion’s share’ of these studies 
highlights the commanding role of the United States in IMF policy, with a minority 
considering the influence of the other shareholders and private actors in the world economy. I 
then discuss the role of the chief negotiators—the IMF’s staff. This literature argues that the 
IMF is mostly comprised of responsible technocrats but that there is sometimes potential for 
rent-seeking. An alternative perspective argues that the IMF bureaucracy’s unique 
organisational culture can manipulate both powerful states and technocrats to influence 
negotiations. 
In the second part of the article, I examine the events surrounding Ireland’s 2010 
EU/IMF programme. After first providing the background to the financial crisis, the 
discussion considers how the different perspectives from the IMF literature can shed light on 
Ireland’s negotiations with the Troika. I find stronger support for explanations that focus on 
the economic and financial interests of the IMF’s large shareholders. There is less convincing 
evidence to support some of the other explanations, namely those that focus on geopolitics, 
the preferences of the IMF’s bureaucracy, and domestic politics in the bailout recipient. 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF IMF DECISION-MAKING 
Ireland’s programme of financial support was designed by officials from the IMF, EU and 
Ireland but it is a typical long-term IMF programme in many respects. It is comprised of IMF 
policy conditions—structural benchmarks and performance criteria—that have been applied 
in hundreds of other countries. Ireland’s progress in implementing the policy conditions is 
continually monitored by the IMF’s staff and the organisation’s shareholders.2 At the most 
general level, there are two broad approaches to explaining how politics affects the 
negotiation, design, and content of these kinds of programmes. The first approach emphasises 
the external drivers of IMF policy, most notably the influence of the powerful states that have 
a controlling interest in the organisation. The second approach stresses the internal drivers, 
specifically the IMF’s bureaucracy. Within each of these broad approaches there are many 
variations. For example, among scholars who focus on the Fund’s bureaucracy, some view it 
as a benign technocracy, while others argue that the integrity of its programmes has been 
undermined by staff rent-seeking. 
The IMF’s main decision-making forum is its executive board, which meets daily to 
discuss its programmes and policies. It is comprised of five directors appointed by the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan (hereafter the G5). The remaining 19 
seats on the 24-member council are filled by election. Without having to contest elections, the 
representatives of the large shareholders do not need to cater to the interests of other 
countries in advance of elections, allowing their representatives to advance their own 
countries’ national interests more effectively. Apart from this advantage, the G5 possess 
around 40 per cent of the IMF’s votes, giving them the ability to easily form a coalition to 
pass any decision over lending, conditionality or programme design. Even without the need 
to form a coalition, the G5 have enough votes to veto any major policy decision that would 
change the way in which the organisation is governed by its membership, thus preserving the 
status quo. As such, the group’s power is enshrined in the organisation’s rules and design. 
However, it is rarely invoked or formally exercised. Instead, it prefers informal decision-
                                                          
2
 For a discussion of surveillance relevant to Ireland see Michael Breen, ‘IMF surveillance of Ireland 
during the Celtic Tiger’, Irish Political Studies 27 (3) (2012), 431–9. 
3 
making procedures, leading to the appearance of consensus. That the organisation proceeds 
by consensus gives the other member states an incentive to participate, as long as they do not 
form coalitions to block programmes that are favourable to G5 interests. 
The United States 
Scholars of international relations have long argued that the US has a privileged and 
commanding position at the IMF.3 Its influence has been a source of great controversy, with 
many arguing that it is substantial and above that of any other member-state.4 Anecdotal 
evidence of US interventions abounds. Charles Calomiris, for example, commenting on an 
IMF loan to Ecuador, noted that it was viewed by many as a side payment to the Ecuadoran 
government in return for the continuing use of military bases to monitor drug traffic.5 
Similarly, Calomiris speculated that Pakistan’s access to an IMF loan may have been 
conditional on its willingness to sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Going beyond mere 
anecdotes, systematic qualitative research has already illustrated the importance of the United 
States in selected lending cases; according to Bessma Momani, the United States intervened 
in 1987 and 1991 to secure lenient IMF treatment for Egypt in order to preserve the political 
stability of the pro-Western Egyptian regime during that period.6 
Are these once-off interventions or does the US regularly use and abuse the IMF? In 
the first quantitative study of US influence at the IMF, Strom Thacker examined the 
relationship between voting patterns at the United Nations and the probability that a country 
would receive a loan from the IMF and found that countries which moved towards the US 
position on key issues were more likely to get a loan. Similarly, countries that move away 
from the US are less likely to do so.7 Since Thacker’s study, several other studies have 
confirmed his original findings8 although others have found no evidence of a link.9 
Besides this participation in IMF programmes, researchers have found evidence of US 
influence over conditionality. Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen, for example, find that closer 
allies of the US—again measured by voting affinity in the UN—have to meet fewer 
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conditions.10 . Similarly, Randall Stone finds that the US does intervene strategically to 
reduce the scope of conditionality for favoured borrowing countries.11 
Another important policy decision concerns when to re-admit a country to an IMF 
programme following its failure to implement the conditions of its previous programme. In 
two separate studies on Africa and Eastern Europe, Stone found that countries with strategic 
links to the US, the UK and France received shorter programme suspensions or ‘punishment 
intervals’, before being allowed to continue to draw on Fund resources.12 Thomas Oatley and 
Jason Yackee also argue that US interests decisively shape IMF short-term lending 
programmes. In a study of the period from 1986–1998, the authors find that the size of IMF 
loans is dependent on the extent of US banking and foreign policy interests in the borrowing 
countries.13 Similarly, J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Hawes find evidence that US 
commercial bank exposure increases the likelihood of IMF assistance for a country 
experiencing a financial crisis.14 Finally, in a study of conditionality agreements from 1990–
2002, Stone has found even more evidence of US influence in reducing the severity of 
conditionality in strategically important countries.15 
These studies provide an impressive array of evidence on the importance of US 
interests across several prominent IMF policies (lending, conditionality, programme 
approval, punishment intervals). There are also a number of implications for Ireland’s 2010 
EU/IMF programme. First, one would expect the US to support any IMF-led rescue 
programme for Ireland even if the loan far exceeded the IMF’s normal financing limitations. 
The immediate threat to the US financial system would most likely allow the US Department 
of the Treasury to overcome any opposition to the bailout from Congress. Second, given the 
demonstrated ability of the US to influence IMF policy, it would most likely intervene in 
negotiations between Ireland and the IMF/EC/ECB if any of the programme’s content ran 
contrary to US interests. Previous research has demonstrated that US support for major 
bailouts is rarely unconditional in cases of high geopolitical or financial importance. US 
involvement could take many forms including intervention to secure financing or to reduce 
the severity of conditionality. 
The large shareholders 
While there is an impressive array of evidence on the role of the US, there are not as many 
studies that consider the other powerful shareholders—Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and Japan. This is a puzzling omission because there is not that much of a gap in 
IMF voting power between these shareholders and the United States. There is also, at the 
same time, a commonly held view among leading international economists and policy-makers 
that the Fund’s largest shareholders have substantial input into the IMF’s broader goals and 
mission.16 
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One notable exception that explores the role of other shareholders is Stone’s analysis 
of IMF lending in Africa, which finds that both British and French influence exists over the 
duration of ‘punishment intervals’ or length of time during which a country is punished for 
failing to fulfil the terms of its programme before finally being allowed to continue to draw 
on Fund resources.17 Seonjou Kang goes further, arguing that the Fund’s five largest 
shareholders—the G5—intervene to relax conditionality where their strategic and financial 
interests are at stake.18 Dreher and Jensen’s study also establishes a statistical relationship 
between G7 voting at the United Nations General Assembly and IMF conditionality in regard 
to borrowing countries.19 
Mark Copelovitch argues that conditionality decisions are dependent on the 
heterogeneity and intensity of G5 interests in each specific case that comes before the 
Executive Board but finds limited evidence to support this argument from a statistical 
analysis of conditionality.20 Michael Breen, on the other hand, finds that the large 
shareholders engage in a co-operative bargaining process such that IMF agreements contain 
fewer binding conditions when a suspension of IMF lending plausibly would impose greater 
hardship on creditor country banks and exporters.21 
What all of these studies suggest is that the US is not the only important stakeholder 
during financial crises. Other powerful states also have an important role in international 
negotiations. This is particularly relevant to Ireland, Greece, and Portugal, where the IMF’s 
large European shareholders—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—had a much 
greater stake in the outcome of bailout negotiations than the United States. As for the US, an 
emerging literature predicts that the other large shareholders should support any IMF-led 
rescue programme for Ireland even if the loan far exceeded the IMF’s normal financing 
limitations. Given the immediate threat to the global financial system, and the economic 
interdependence of the world’s largest economies, they would be able to overcome any 
domestic opposition. 
While it is likely that the powerful shareholders could intervene in negotiations 
between Ireland and the IMF if any of the programme’s content ran contrary to their interests, 
it is less clear how they co-operate as a group to influence negotiations. Breen argues that the 
G5 shareholders tend to support the most exposed shareholder. So for example, the US 
should support the German and French position in international negotiations with the Irish 
government.22 Therefore, if any features of Ireland’s programme were to run contrary to the 
Germany or French interests, intervention should be expected. Copelovitch’s argument leaves 
more room for conflict among the US and the European shareholders over Ireland’s 
programme, opening up the possibility that the IMF’s staff can sometimes have a much 
stronger role in international negotiations,23 whereas Stone suggests that the European 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business, Economics and Public Policy Working 
Paper 2004–06 (2004); Lex Rieffel, Restructuring sovereign debt: the case for ad hoc machinery (Washington, 
DC, 2003); Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or bail-ins? responding to financial crises in emerging 
economies (Washington, DC, 2004). 
17
 Stone, ‘The political economy of IMF Lending in Africa’. 
18
 Seonjou Kang, ‘Agree to reform? The political economy of conditionality variation in International 
Monetary Fund lending, 1983–1997’, European Journal of Political Research 46 (5) (2007), 685–720. 
19
 Dreher and Jensen, ‘Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests 
on IMF conditions’. 
20
 Mark S. Copelovitch, ‘Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF 
lending’, International Studies Quarterly 54 (1) (2010), 49–77. 
21
 Michael Breen, ‘IMF conditionality and the economic exposure of its shareholders’, European 
Journal of International Relations (forthcoming 2013). 
22
 Michael Breen, ‘IMF conditionality and the economic exposure of its shareholders’. 
23
 Mark S. Copelovitch, ‘Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF 
lending’. 
6 
shareholders should have little influence during negotiations.24 While the literature is 
somewhat divided on how the world’s most powerful economies co-operate during 
negotiations with countries like Ireland, political economists are united behind the argument 
that powerful states have influence over IMF programmes. 
The borrowers 
So far I have focused on the powerful shareholders; however, an alternative view is that 
politics in the potential recipients of IMF financing are decisive during negotiations. Policy 
makers in Ireland should, according to this view, seize the opportunity to introduce 
groundbreaking reforms in key areas like health, education or social welfare, where the 
government has previously been unable to make progress. According to Vreeland, this is a 
common feature of IMF arrangements, which are often designed to provide political cover for 
governments that would otherwise be unable to implement any necessary adjustment.25 
Another view is that IMF programmes are ultimately the outcome of negotiation between the 
IMF staff and officials from the borrowing country, suggesting that the partisan interests of 
the politicians and parties drive government policy, and therefore need to be considered when 
trying to explain variation in IMF behaviour.26 However, many countries have few other 
options but to turn to the IMF for assistance following an economic shock and cannot afford 
the luxury of picking and choosing among financiers. This leaves borrowing countries in a 
weak position to refuse IMF assistance. Rather, it seems more plausible that IMF 
programmes are designed to respond to borrowing countries’ economic needs, rather than 
their demands.27 Nevertheless, politicians and officials from the borrowing country have 
input into programme design and are ultimately responsible for implementation. 
The bureaucracy 
For many years international relations (IR) theorists had little to say about how international 
bureaucracies affect world politics. For the most part, bureaucracies were treated as entities 
with no independence from their creators. In recent times, scholars have argued that we need 
to turn our attention to understanding how international organisations actually work, what 
they do after they are created and whether their behaviour conforms to expectations.28 As a 
result, there are now several studies of the IMF that stress the internal logic of its behaviour. 
The first approach, originating mainly from economics, views the Fund as a benign 
technocracy that tries but often fails to provide global public goods. Many economists have 
long viewed the IMF as a technocracy, where experts use their control over decision-making 
to design and implement optimal policies. Sometimes referred to as the ‘optimal policy 
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approach’, this view of the IMF’s behaviour rests on several assumptions.29 First, it assumes 
that the Fund is largely free from political interference and that it uses this freedom to provide 
global public goods. Second, the approach assumes that the staff and political representatives 
who design and oversee the organisation’s policies are mostly interested in translating the 
latest insights from economic theory into good policies which in turn lead to good outcomes 
like economic growth. Whenever the Fund fails to deliver optimal policies, so the story goes, 
this is due to market failures or a lack of information. When applied to Ireland’s bailout 
negotiations, supporters of this approach would argue that the key features of the rescue 
programme—the pace of the fiscal adjustment, the size of the loan and the issue of debt 
restructuring—would be based only on sound economic policy and that the Irish government, 
its shareholders and European institutions would generally follow the IMF’s advice even in 
cases where it runs contrary to their interests. 
Another approach, also first articulated among economists, contends that bureaucrats, 
particularly of the international variety, have incentives towards rent-seeking behaviour.30 
Coming broadly under the label of public choice, supporters of this approach expect 
principal-agent relationships to determine the behaviour and activities of the IMF. According 
to Roland Vaubel, in years where the Fund’s budget is reviewed by the Board of Governors 
(quota review years), the staff should ‘hurry-up lending’.31 By depleting resources in the year 
of a quota review, the bureaucracy is sending a strong signal to the shareholders that its 
current budget allocation is stretched to capacity and should be increased. This sort of 
behaviour is standard practice in bureaucracies with budget cycles; both spending and lending 
should increase at the end of the cycle. Supporters of this view would argue that the IMF is 
sometimes too ‘trigger happy’: in order to increase its own revenue it is willing to lend to 
countries like Ireland while also relaxing the strictness of conditionality to encourage 
borrowing.32 
SEPTEMBER 2008 AND IRELAND’S 2010 EU/IMF PROGRAMME 
When Greece secured financial support in 2010 the focus of international markets and the 
IMF turned immediately to Ireland, which was engulfed in the worst financial crisis it had 
experienced since the foundation of the state.33 In September 2008, the government had taken 
the unorthodox step of issuing a two-year blanket guarantee of the liabilities of Irish-
controlled banks. The blanket guarantee stands outs as unnecessarily ambitious in scope 
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when compared with other measures used to contain systemic financial crises. 34 
Nevertheless, it initially had a positive effect on market behavior: deposits returned to Irish 
banks, sparking outrage among some officials in other governments. Despite its initial 
success it soon became clear that the losses in Irish banks were much worse than anticipated 
and that the government could not possibly meet the terms of its own guarantee without 
bankrupting its own citizens. From that point forward, Ireland required external assistance if 
it was to avoid a messy sovereign default. 
Preliminary discussions among the ECB, EC, the IMF and officials in the Irish 
administration proceeded over the summer months about the possibility of financial 
support.35 By late summer of 2010 the government still had access to international funding 
but Ireland’s position began to deteriorate sharply at the end of September. As the news about 
Ireland’s banks became worse, it became clear that markets would not rollover previous 
loans. This was compounded by ECB council members who spooked depositors by signaling 
the institution’s reluctance to maintain open-ended support for the Irish banking system. 
During September, depositors withdrew 18 billion euro from domestic banks and 13 billion 
euro from non-domestic banks. Overall, deposits had declined by roughly 125 billion euro 
from a peak of 600 billion euro in late 2008.36 As the bank run accelerated, the ECB’s 
commitment to support the banking system was no longer enough to contain the crisis: a 
programme of financial support was necessary to draw a line under the loss of confidence in 
the government’s guarantee of the banking system’s liabilities. 
Although the Irish authorities’ discussions with the IMF had been ongoing, the 
administration was reluctant to acknowledge their existence. In early October 2010, the 
minister for finance, Brian Lenihan, travelled to Washington D.C. to meet with the IMF. This 
marked a crucial turning point for the Irish administration—by the end of the meeting there 
was a general view that some form of external help would be required. The spread—or 
difference between the price of Irish and German government bonds—had reached such high 
levels that by 4 November, the governor of the central bank, Patrick Honohan, had formed 
the view that Ireland had passed a critical threshold—a point of no return—and that 
discussions with the IMF should commence over the possibility of financial assistance. 
Honohan subsequently informed Kevin Cardiff at the Department of Finance that this critical 
threshold of sustainability had been exceeded.37 While senior officials in the Irish 
administration were now aware of the necessity of IMF support, this view was not necessarily 
shared by senior politicians. Key members of the government, namely the minister for 
finance, Brian Lenihan, were still holding out for an arrangement without IMF involvement. 
Presumably acting with the consent of the taoiseach, the Department of Finance adopted a 
strategy of denial in the hope that the ECB/EC would provide a package of financial support 
that would allow the administration to ‘save face’ domestically.38 
The government most likely wanted a flexible line of credit rather than a traditional 
IMF stand-by or extended programme, so that it would not have to endure the humiliation of 
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signing a formal IMF agreement and could go on to frame the promise of financial support as 
merely a precautionary measure. However, the ECB Governing Council and members of the 
Eurogroup of Finance Ministers had resolved to take action, regardless of the delaying tactics 
or preferences of the Irish administration. It is alleged that just two days before a deal was 
agreed, a letter was sent from the president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, to the minister 
for finance, Brian Lenihan, threatening the withdrawal of emergency liquidity assistance if 
Ireland did not accept a bailout.39 In the end, it was the governor of the central bank, Patrick 
Honohan, who took the unprecedented step of bypassing the government and making a public 
announcement on morning radio that financial assistance was imminent. 
The role of the shareholders 
Although Ireland’s EU/IMF programme is only one of hundreds of similar bailouts over the 
last few decades, it ranks as one of the largest in history. Collectively, the world’s largest 
economies had no choice but to orchestrate a series of bilateral and multilateral loans towards 
the bailout. The crisis was of such a magnitude that Ireland was the first item on the agenda 
of the G20 summit, the fifth meeting of the G20 heads of government, which took place in 
South Korea in mid-November 2011.40 Officials from the US Treasury feared possible 
contagion from the crisis in Ireland and made it clear they were prepared to intervene if 
necessary.41 The IMF literature has demonstrated that the world’s most powerful economies 
do not support unconditional bailouts—the terms of such bailouts rarely go against their 
strategic and economic interests. 
As negotiations continued over the form of financial support Ireland would receive, a 
clear division emerged between the European shareholders and the IMF’s staff. The minister 
for finance, Brian Lenihan, had discussed the possibility of imposing losses on the senior 
bondholders of Irish banks with the IMF’s managing director, Dominque Strauss-Kahn, and 
the president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet. During the negotiations, the IMF mission 
team, led by AJ Chopra, the deputy director of the European department, was in agreement 
with the Irish authorities that some form of haircut should be imposed on the senior 
bondholders of Irish banks who were not covered by the extensive government guarantee. 
This position was shot down by the European Central Bank and the other large IMF 
shareholders.42 They made it clear that they would not support a programme unless Ireland 
agreed to cover the losses of all senior bondholders, even those not covered by the Irish 
government’s guarantee. In all likelihood, the key shareholders—France and Germany—
feared that a comprehensive debt restructuring deal for Irish banks would expose the 
weaknesses in their banks, which were highly exposed to Ireland and the rest of the European 
periphery. A further consequence of granting Ireland better terms would be the necessity to 
revisit Greece’s deal and to possibly hasten negotiations with other failing economies. And 
furthermore, for their generosity, the French and German governments feared they might 
suffer a worse electoral backlash for being seen to use taxpayers’ funds to help the European 
periphery. 
For the most part, the main shareholders adopted a unified position during the 
negotiations. The ECB/EC and the French and German governments were united in their 
preference that even unguaranteed senior bondholders would not have to suffer losses. While 
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the other IMF shareholders could have blocked the deal they eventually supported the 
European position. At a conference call with the G7 finance ministers, the US secretary of the 
Treasury, Timothy Geithner, was of the view that bank bondholders should not shoulder 
losses. Geithner also intervened in the 1997 Asian financial crisis when he was an official in 
the US Treasury. During crisis negotiations he met with the IMF’s mission and persuaded 
them to support Thailand to guarantee deposits in its bust banks, helping to settle a bitter 
dispute among the IMF’s staff over this issue.43 When details of Geithner’s intervention in 
the Irish case were leaked to the media, an unnamed senior US government official 
responded that: ‘The ECB and EC were both dead opposed and they are decisive. The US is 
not a decision-maker on European issues’.44 
Although the full extent of the role of the shareholders in the negotiations is still not 
clear, Timothy Geithner, as a former senior IMF official, had a deep knowledge of and 
practical experience of international bailout negotiations. He was a senior official in the US 
Department of the Treasury when it successfully co-ordinated a massive voluntary scheme of 
commercial bank lending as part of Korea’s 1997 IMF programme45 and afterwards became a 
senior IMF official before being appointed as US secretary of the Treasury. 
With the EU authorities providing the lion’s share of the bailout funds, any 
intervention by the US to block the deal could have seriously disrupted international relations 
among the world’s major economic powers. It would have implied that the US was 
attempting to become a decision-maker on European issues. Moreover, it would probably 
have yielded little as the EU authorities could have walked away from the negotiations and 
offered funding without IMF involvement. While the Irish case is a clear-cut example of the 
IMF’s staff yielding to their political masters, it is also a case in which the IMF would have 
found it difficult to act independently without the additional financing provided by the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM). At 22.5 billion euro, the IMF’s portion of the bailout was already a historically large 
loan as a percentage of Ireland’s undersized IMF quota, yet it was only a fraction of the 85 
billion euro package of financial support. The loan was comprised of 12.5 billion provided by 
Ireland’s national pension reserve fund, 5 billion in cash reserves from the Irish, 22.5 billion 
from the EFSM, 17.5 billion from the EFSF, and bilateral loans from the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Sweden to the sum of 5 billion. 
Strategic interests 
The role of geopolitics is prominent in the IMF literature but it was not an important 
consideration for any of the political actors involved in Ireland’s EU/IMF bailout. While 
previous high-profile IMF lending cases in Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq have all had an 
important geopolitical dimension, the G5 had few security-related reasons for providing 
Ireland with better terms. A possible exception to this argument is the UK which is perhaps 
why it was the only dissenting voice during the negotiations. According to economist Morgan 
Kelly, George Osborne, the chancellor of the Exchequer, was the only one among the G7 
finance ministers to speak up for Irish interests.46 However, the UK’s dissension among the 
shareholders needs to be put into perspective. Both states share close historical, social and 
economic ties and maintain a joint interest in the stability of Northern Ireland. Both 
governments also have a long record of political co-operation enshrined in several 
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international treaties. For these reasons it should have been expected that the UK would adopt 
a more critical tone than other shareholders. Ultimately, however, the UK did not move to 
block the programme until better terms could be agreed, as it had done during Iceland’s 
financial crisis. 
The negotiators 
The IMF negotiators were forced to go against good practice and agree to a programme that 
clearly had no chance of putting Ireland on a sustainable debt path without further external 
support, thereby removing a central pillar of any international rescue. On the one hand, this 
could be taken as evidence of the failure of the IMF to live up to its reputation as a 
technocracy. On the other hand, it could be viewed as a necessary compromise within the 
given political constraints imposed on the architects of Ireland’s programme. There is a 
reasonable argument that it was the best deal on offer and the only way to ‘buy time’ in 
anticipation of further European support. Nevertheless, adherents of the public choice view of 
international organisations would argue that as a self-interested bureaucracy the IMF holds 
incentives to yield to the shareholders in difficult cases like Ireland’s, even at the expense of 
a sustainable programme. If it were to refuse to co-operate, it would risk being forced to sit 
on the sidelines as the EU proceeded with a unilateral bailout. In other words, if the IMF 
were to refuse to co-operate with its political masters, it would be relegated to the status of an 
international institution of little importance. Overall, the Irish and European sovereign debt 
crisis has provoked serious debate and disagreement among the staff. Uncharacteristically for 
the IMF, this has even leaked into the public domain, as one economist, in their resignation 
letter, voiced their shame at the institution’s failure to address its ‘analytical risk aversion, 
bilateral priority, and European bias’, which had contributed to a failure to deal with the 
global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.47 
Domestic politics 
Arguments from the IMF literature that focus on importance of domestic politics during 
negotiations are not satisfactory when applied to Ireland’s bailout. There is little evidence that 
the G5, EU or IMF’s position in the negotiations was affected by Irish politics. 
Unsurprisingly, most politicians were not aware of the negotiations, which were a closely -
guarded secret because of their potential to disrupt financial markets. But furthermore in the 
Irish case, even senior members of government were not briefed. This led to a series of 
embarrassing communication blunders that were amateurish by the standards of rich 
democracy, as senior cabinet ministers strongly denied the existence of negotiations just days 
before the financial package was announced. At the same time, the Department of Finance 
attempted to delay the decision to accept financial support in order to negotiate better terms. 
Their delaying tactics were overtaken by external events at the G7 and Eurogroup level. 
Essentially, their miscalculation was a belief that the government could dictate the pace of 
negotiations because it still possessed enough cash reserves to continue for several months 
without external support. This view assumed that outside parties affected by the crisis would 
not take swift action to prevent it from spilling over into a general run on the European 
banking system. After the bailout negotiations were made public by Honohan, Ireland’s 
coalition government immediately began to fracture. Fianna Fáil’s junior coalition partner, 
the Green Party, indicated that it would pull out of government after the December budget 
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and EU/IMF funding programme have been secured.48 There is little evidence that this 
political realignment or the remarkable general election that the bailout precipitated in 2011 
had an impact on the major terms of Ireland’s programme, namely the pace of fiscal 
adjustment and the issue of debt restructuring. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Ireland’s financial crisis may have been largely home-grown but it threatened the stability of 
the global financial system and the survival of the euro currency. Many of the world’s most 
powerful states had a strong interest in containing the crisis and it was the first item on the 
G20’s agenda in Seoul. While the programme of financial support is sometimes portrayed as 
a compromise among a group of responsible technocrats, the negotiations were shaped by the 
political interests of a group of powerful states. This explains why a more comprehensive 
debt restructuring was not achieved during the negotiations: the IMF’s negotiators were 
unable to act contrary to the interests of Germany, France, the ECB/EC and the other large 
G7 shareholders. The literature on IMF decision-making demonstrated that these kind of 
political pressures are a common feature of other international bailouts. Responsible 
technocrats are ultimately subject to political constraints when negotiating under pressure. 
There is less convincing evidence to support some of the other arguments from the literature, 
namely, those that focus on the role of negotiators, domestic politics in the recipient, and the 
strategic interests of the shareholders. 
As the European sovereign debt crisis unfolds, hopefully some of the constraints will 
loosen and Ireland’s unmanageable debt burden can be addressed. Regardless of whether the 
current programme restores Ireland’s credibility in the eyes of the international markets, it is 
a stern test for Ireland’s political system. Few modern democracies have had to undertake 
such a large fiscal retrenchment in recent decades and it remains an open question whether 
any economy can withstand what is potentially a lethal dosage of fiscal retrenchment.49 
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